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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-2-
2(3)0) (2002). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment on all claims in 
favor of Salt Lake City Coiporation based either on a lack of ripeness and the 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies or on the merits of both the state and 
federal constitutional claims? 
Standard of Review 
The Supreme Court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment 
as a question of law for correctness. Wasatch Crest Ins. Co. v. LWP Claims 
Adm'rs Corp., 2007 UT 32, ^  6, 158 P.3d 548. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Constitution 
Article I § 1 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according 
to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, 
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and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and 
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
Article 1 § 4 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or 
for any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or 
juror on account or religious belief or the absence thereof. There shall be no union 
of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. No property qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
Article III $ 1 
First:-Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant 
of this State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her 
mode of religious worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever 
prohibited. 
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United States Constitution 
First Amendment 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Salt Lake City Code of Ordinances 
§ 21A.12.010 et seq. Administrative Interpretations 
Because of its length, section 21 A. 12.010 et seq. is attached in the 
Addendum at tab 5. 
§ 21A. 16.010 et seq. Appeals of Administrative Decisions 
Because of its length, section 21A. 16.010 et seq. is attached in the Addendum at 
tab 8. 
§21 A.54.010 et seq. Conditional Uses 
Because of its length, section 21 A. 54.010 et seq. is attached in the 
Addendum at tab 6. 
§21A.62,040 Definitions 
Because of its length, section 21 A.62.040 is attached in the Addendum at 
tab 7. Of particular relevance to this matter are the definitions of "Accessory use", 
"Boarding house", "Homeless shelter", and "Place of worship". 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A) 
A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue 
exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact 
set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose 
of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 Summary Judgment 
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(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for 
summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts 
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rale, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rale, must set forth specific 
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facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Salt Lake City Mission and Pastor Wayne Wilson (collectively the 
"Mission") have tried to find a location from which to base their operations which 
include religious worship and ministering to people without homes and with drug 
addictions, and providing shelter, food, and clothing to people in need. At various 
times the Mission has attempted to locate its work in different locations. The 
Mission has pursued obtaining approval from Salt Lake City Corporation (the 
"City") for such locations to varying degrees of completeness. At no time has the 
Mission both found a place from which to base its operations and completed the 
process necessary to determine whether the City will approve that location. 
Because of this failing, the district court found that the case was not ripe for 
decision. 
The Court went beyond its finding of lack of ripeness to consider the case 
on its merits. The Court held that even if the claims were ripe for decision, the 
Mission had put forth insufficient evidence to prove a violation of either the State 
or Federal Constitution. 
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II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS1 
The Mission bases its constitutional claims on its attempts to relocate from 
its Gateway location in 1998. The Mission lost the lease on the Gateway location 
because of the actions of its landlord, and not those of Salt Lake City. (R. 3996 *h 
51 (Reply Mem. in Supp. of Salt Lake City's Mot. for Summ. J. in Addendum at 
tab 2).) The Mission inquired with the City about relocating and was informed 
about the process. (R. 3197 ^ 82 (Pis.' Mem. in Opp'n to Salt Lake City's Mot. for 
Summ. J. in Addendum at tab 1).) 
A. City Zoning Ordinances and the Approval Process 
Relocation of the Mission, as with all land uses, is governed by the City's 
zoning ordinances. In the zoning code, a permitted use is one that is allowed 
merely by filing for a permit and meeting applicable City codes. (R. 3198 f^ 133 at 
tab 1.) The permissibility of a conditional use is determined by the Planning 
The City does not address facts which it deems irrelevant to determination of this 
case. The City is admitting these facts. 
The Mission purported to dispute this fact at Summary Judgment but provided no 
factual support for such dispute. (R. 3197 ^ 8 at tab 1.) Thus, this fact is properly 
deemed admitted. Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
"[e]ach fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum [in support of summary 
judgment] is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
controverted by the responding party." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A) (noting that each 
controverted fact "shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by 
citation to relevant materials"); see Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130, 
at Tf 50, 63P.3d705, 717. 
The Mission purported to dispute this fact at Summary Judgment but provided no 
factual support for such dispute. (R. 3198 ^ 13 at tab 1.) Thus, this fact is 
properly deemed admitted. See note 1, supra. 
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Commission after consideration of an application, staff report, and after a public 
hearing where the applicant and the community can speak. 
A conditional use is a use which has potential 
adverse impacts upon the immediate 
neighborhood and the city as a whole. It 
requires a careful review of its location, design, 
configuration and special impact to determine 
the desirability of allowing it on a particular 
site. Whether it is appropriate in a particular 
location requires a weighing, in each case, of 
the public need and benefit against the local 
impact, taking into account the applicant's 
proposals for ameliorating any adverse impacts 
through special site planning, development 
techniques and contributions to the provision of 
public improvements, rights of way and 
services. 
(R. 3198-31994 at tab 1.) Any applicant who seeks a conditional use permit must 
appear before the affected neighborhood's community council. (R. 3198-31995 at 
tab 1; R. 3985-3986 f 16 at tab 2.) 
Some uses are conditional because, in general, they may be more 
appropriate in specific areas based on various considerations including what other 
uses are in the vicinity, traffic patterns, capacity of streets, existing infrastructure, 
impacts from the subject type of use on abutting properties, geographical features 
4
 The Mission purported to dispute this fact at Summary Judgment but provided no 
factual support for such dispute. (R. 3198-3199 at tab 1.) Thus, this fact is 
properly deemed admitted. See note 1, supra. 
5
 The Mission purported to dispute this fact at Summary Judgment but provided no 
factual support for such dispute. (R. 3198-3199 at tab 1.) Thus, this fact is 
properly deemed admitted. See note 1, supra. 
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etc. These considerations all play a role in determining what types of uses should 
be allowed at what locations and whether a conditional use should be allowed. 
Due to the potential for detrimental impacts, a conditional use permit is required 
so that each use can be examined individually and a decision made on a case by 
case basis. (R. 3986 f^ 17 at tab 2.) Ultimately, a conditional use is determined by 
whether the proposed use is compatible with the neighborhood and whether it will 
have a material net cumulative adverse impact on the community or the City as a 
whole. (R. 3986 Tf 18 at tab 2.) 
Places of worship are allowed in the City as a matter of right in the 
following zones: Commercial CB, CC, CS, CSHBD, CG; Downtown D-l, D-2, D-
3, D-4; Gateway GMU; and Special Purpose RP, BP, I, UI, MU. These zones 
comprise approximately 10.8% of the area of the City (without including the City 
Creek area). (R. 3200 f^ 196 at tab 1.) Places of worship are also allowed as a 
conditional use in all residential zones, in the Neighborhood Commercial zone 
(CN), and in the Light Manufacturing District (M-l). (R. 3200 U 207 at tab 1.) In 
general places of worship inherently involve large numbers of people congregating 
together with the attendant noise and traffic. Such a use has the potential to have 
The Mission purported to dispute this fact at Summary Judgment but provided no 
factual support for such dispute. (R. 3200 ^ 19 at tab 1.) Thus, this fact is 
properly deemed admitted. See note 1, supra. 
The Mission purported to dispute this fact at Summary Judgment but provided no 
factual support for such dispute. (R. 3200 *| 20 at tab 1.) Thus, this fact is 
properly deemed admitted. See note 1, supra. 
Q 
more negative impacts on residential neighborhoods and fewer impacts in the 
zones where places of worship are permitted as a matter of right. Thus, in many 
areas places of worship are a conditional use to allow the specific fact based 
determination of whether they are appropriate for that area, particularly residential 
areas. (R. 3989 ^ 28 at tab 2.) 
Under Salt Lake City Code of Ordinances section 21 A.62.040, a homeless 
shelter is "a building or portion thereof in which sleeping accommodations are 
provided on an emergency basis for the temporarily homeless." (R. 3200-3201 f^ 
21 at tab 1.) Homeless shelters are allowed as a conditional use in the D-3 and the 
CG zoning districts. Salt Lake City has not prohibited the location of homeless 
shelters in the City. The City has several operating homeless shelters. (R. 3987 ^ | 
21 at tab 2.) At one time, City policy discouraged the concentration of homeless 
shelters, substance abuse treatment centers, and similar uses in the Downtown and 
Gateway area (the so called "moratorium"). However, the policy did not forbid 
such uses, provided that an applicant, including the Mission, applied for a 
conditional use permit. (R. 3987-3988 % 23 at tab 2.) Salt Lake City has 
regulated all homeless shelters, regardless of their ownership or affiliation. (R. 
3988 % 24 at tab 2.) The regulation of homeless shelters is motivated by wholly 
secular concerns, not religious concerns. (R. 3988 [^ 25 at tab 2.) 
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B. The Mission's Attempts to Relocate 
In looking to relocate its operations, the Mission investigated numerous 
properties the "Superfund Site," the "Sutherland Building," the "Traveler's Aid 
Building", the "Cohen Building," and the "Rosewood Terrace Building." 
(Opening Brief at 26-29.) The City issued administrative classifications of the 
Mission's proposed activities as to two of these properties: the Cohen Building 
at 580 West 300 South and the Rosewood Terrace Building at 168 North 600 
West. (R. 2050-2051, 2127-2128 in Opening Brief Addendum; R. 3198 ^ 10 at 
tab 1.) 
The first of these administrative classifications related to the Cohen 
Building. (R. 2050-2051 in Opening Brief Addendum; R. 3198 U 11 at tab 1.) 
The City, through its Zoning Administrator, determined that the Mission's 
proposed activities at that location constituted a place of worship, which was a 
permitted use in zone D3, and a homeless shelter, which was a conditional use. 
(R. 2050-2051 in Opening Brief Addendum; R. 3198 H 11 at tab 1.) The letter 
sent to the Mission regarding this decision stated that the Mission could appeal the 
decision to the Board of Adjustment or apply to the Planning Commission for a 
conditional use permit. (R. 2051 in Opening Brief Addendum.) The Mission did 
not proceed with a conditional use permit application on the Cohen property. (R. 
3984 T| 12 at tab 2; R. 3111 «| 34.) 
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The second administrative classification related to the Rosewood Terrace 
Building. (R. 3988-3989 |^ 26 at tab 2.) Rosewood Terrace was located in zone 
SRI, a zoning category which was a limited residential zone that allowed places of 
worship only as conditional uses. (R. 3989 f^ 27 at tab 2.) The Mission filed a 
conditional use application on September 1, 2000. (R. 3988-3989 <| 26 at tab 2; 
R. 2127 in Opening Brief Addendum.) The City, through its Zoning 
Administrator, determined that the Mission's anticipated activities and services at 
that location included 1) a place of worship and church-related activities; 2) a 
residential boarding house; and 3) training counseling and treatment for 
individuals and families not living at the Mission. (Id.) The City notified the 
Mission of the outstanding issues related to the conditional use application on 
September 14, 1999. The administrative decision letter requested submission of a 
statement regarding the meeting with the community council and submission of 
support for the existence of a nonconforming use that would allow a boarding 
house. (R. 2127-2128 in Opening Brief Addendum.) 
The September 14, 2000 letter states any aggrieved party can appeal the 
determination to the Board of Adjustment within 30 days. (R. 2128 in Opening 
Brief Addendum.) In September 1999, the community council filed an appeal 
challenging the City's administrative classification of the Mission's proposed 
activities. (R. 3209 f^ 31 at tab 1.) In connection with that appeal, the Mission 
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received notice of, had the opportunity and, in fact, did present evidence at the 
Board of Adjustment hearing. (R. 3209-3211 ^ 32 at tab 1.) 
Plaintiffs applied for and were heard regarding a conditional use of the 
Rosewood Terrace property where they wished to locate their place of worship. 
(R. 3989 H 29 at tab 2.) On October 7, 1999, the City Planning Commission 
denied the Mission's application for a conditional use permit to relocate its 
facility to the Rosewood Terrace Building. (R. 3682 in Opening Brief 
Addendum; R. 3208-3209 J^ 30 at tab 1.) Plaintiffs were not granted a conditional 
use at Rosewood Terrace because of the detrimental impact on the neighborhood 
and the inability to mitigate that impact. The Planning Commission determined 
that the neighborhood was too fragile to support the activities proposed by the 
Mission. The Planning Commission determined that there were likely to be heavy 
impacts on the neighborhood from this proposed use. The Mission planned to 
have 25 to 30 residents on a semi-permanent basis in a boarding house at the site 
as well as to bus in up to 200 of the "homeless-poor" at various times during the 
day for a variety of counseling, rehabilitation services, religious devotionals, and 
chapel services. While the Planning Commission thought that the Mission could 
control what went on in its building, the Commission determined that the Mission 
likely would not be able to control what went on outside. This determination was 
based on objective evidence. In its prior location the Mission had a history of at 
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least 58 police calls per year and as high as 122 calls per year. The Mission stated 
that it would perform similar activities in the Rosewood Terrace location and so 
the Planning Commission rationally determined that the Mission would bring with 
it this higher need for police intervention. This need caused particular concern to 
the neighbors surrounding Rosewood Terrace because they were trying to recover 
from activities which had required police in the past. The neighborhood included 
the Guadalupe neighborhood and the Fairpark community. Both communities 
were reviving from previous times of drug houses and high crime. The 
communities intended to establish safe, stable, and cohesive neighborhoods and 
were progressing in that direction. The Planning Commission determined that the 
impact of the Mission would reverse that progress. Thus, the Planning 
Commission concluded that the need for the conditional use did not outweigh the 
potential impact on the community and that mitigating the detrimental impact the 
Mission would impose upon that fragile neighborhood would not be possible. (R. 
3208-3209 ^ 30 at tabl.) The Mission did not timely appeal the Planning 
Commission's denial of the conditional use for the Rosewood Terrace building 
although it could have by appealing to the Land Use Appeals Board. (SLCOO § 
21A.54.160 at tab 6; R. 3212 1f 34 at tab 1.) 
In November 1999, the Board of Adjustment heard the appeal of the 
administrative determination regarding the Mission's proposed uses and held 
14 
that the Mission's proposed activities constituted a place of worship and a 
homeless shelter. (R. 3212 ^ 338 at tab 1.) The Mission did not file a timely 
appeal of the Board of Adjustment's decision either. (R. 3212 ]^ 35 at tab 1 
SLCOO § 21A.16.040 at tab 8.) 
Ultimately, Plaintiffs continued their activities in the Central Christian 
Church located at 370 East 300 South in Salt Lake City and increased virtually all 
of their services. (Opening Brief at 24, R. 3115 f 46.) 
In late 2003 and 2004, the Mission revisited the possibility of relocating to 
the Rosewood building. (R. 3119 f 62; R. 31211f t 67-69; R. 3682-83 in Opening 
Brief Addendum). On June 7, 2004, the Acting Zoning Administrator informed 
the Mission he could not alter the Board of Adjustment's 1999 decision about the 
classification of the Mission's proposed activities unless the planned uses of the 
building had changed. (R. 3683 in Opening Brief Addendum.) The Mission has 
not appealed this decision either. (See R. 3121-3122 at tab 3 (not suggesting any 
appeal was taken).) 
C. Interfaith Hospitality Network 
The zoning ordinances and their regulation of temporary housing for the 
homeless have a secular purpose, to limit the impact on neighborhoods to a 
o 
Plaintiffs purported to dispute this fact at Summary Judgment but provided no 
factual support for such dispute. (R. 3212 ^ 33 at tab 1.) Thus, this fact is 
properly deemed admitted. See note 1, supra. 
is 
reasonable level. (R. 3993 ^ 41 at tab 2.) Several Salt Lake area churches 
participate in the Interfaith Hospitality Network. (R. 3215 ^ 42 at tab 1.) 
Those Interfaith Hospitality churches operate within certain guidelines. 
Pursuant to those guidelines, each church may house a maximum of 4-6 
homeless families (a maximum of 16-20 persons) for one week, four or five 
times a year on a rotating schedule. (R. 3215 j^ 43 at tab l.9) The City has 
stated that it is willing to allow the Mission or any other church to operate 
according to these same Interfaith Hospitality guidelines. (R. 3216-3218 ^ 44 
at tab 1.) The Mission has acknowledged that it does not intend to operate its 
activities within those Interfaith Hospitality guidelines. (R. 3218 |^ 45 at tab 1.) 
D. Monetary Damages Requested 
Plaintiffs have requested monetary damages for the alleged federal 
constitutional violations. (Opening Brief at 11, Issue #3.) Plaintiffs, however, 
have said their claim for expenses involved in moving, abandonment of 
improvements to their prior location, loss of property in the move, lost 
contributions and improvements to the new building were submitted for 
relocation compensation "and are not claimed under that Act as against the City". 
9
 Wliile Plaintiffs refer to an Affidavit of Matthew Hilton in their brief, they do not 
cite to a paragraph and no part of the Affidavit appears to relate to the Interfaith 
Hospitality Network. (See R. 3809-3820 at tab 4.) 
16 
(R. 3220 ^ 49 at tab 1.) Plaintiffs provide no factual support for other monetary 
damages claimed against the City. (Id.) 
During the period of time for which it claims monetary damages, the 
Mission had income (money coming into the Mission) of $673,920.57. (R.3996 ^ 
52 at tab 2.) The Mission had expenses during that time period of $383,793.66. 
(R. 3996-3997 % 53 at tab 2.) The Mission had net income, or a net surplus, of 
$290,126.91. (R. 3997 ^ 54 at tab 2.) During a comparable period outside of the 
time frame for which the Mission is claiming monetary damages, the Mission had 
income of $807,456.57, expenses of $563,356.71, and a surplus of only 
$244,099.86. (R. 3997 at ^ 55 at tab 2.) 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to decide this matter as the Mission has failed 
to exhaust administrative remedies and its claims are not ripe for decision. These 
failings eliminate all of the Mission's claims. To the extent the Court may 
disagree with this conclusion, the City's actions withstand challenge under both 
the State and Federal Free Exercise Clauses. The Mission has waived all other 
arguments, including its Due Process Claim by failing to argue the issue in its 
briefing.10 Under these circumstances, the Court should affirm the decision below 
The City agrees that the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution applies to 
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. This Case is Not Ripe for Decision. 
The district court granted summary judgment on all of the Mission's 
constitutional claims because they are not ripe. (R. 4045 Plaintiffs-Appellants' 
Opening Brief.) Specifically, the Court stated "until Plaintiffs pick a location, 
apply for a conditional use, and obtain a final determination on that, Plaintiffs 
[sic] constitutional claims are not ripe. Indeed, it is only at this time that the Court 
and the parties will know what would have happened and whether any 
constitutional violations have occurred." (Id.) Two separate analyses of ripeness 
are appropriate given the different treatment of state constitutional law claims and 
federal claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 
_L This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear the Mission's State 
Constitutional Claims Because the Mission has Failed to 
Exhaust Administrative Remedies Making the Claims Unripe. 
The Mission has never exhausted the administrative process designed to 
address land use disputes. Under Utah Code section 10-9a-801(l), the Mission 
cannot challenge the land use decisions embodied in the administrative decisions 
or the Board of Adjustment's decision because it has failed to exhaust the 
administrative remedies available to the Mission. Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 
2003 UT 7, ffi[ 16-17, 67 P.3d 466 (dismissing state law claims for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies available for municipal land use decisions before 
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filing in district court). The requirement to exhaust administrative remedies 
applies to state constitutional claims as well as to claims for equitable relief. 
Patterson, at ^ 18-19. The policy justification behind requiring the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is long established: a ' to allow an administrative agency 
to perform functions within its special competence-to make a factual record, to 
apply its expertise, and to correct its own error so as to moot judicial 
controversies.'" Horn v. Utah Dept. of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (quoting Maverik Country Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 860 P.2d 
944, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction, leaving it with "'only the 
authority to dismiss the action.'" Horn, 962 P.2d at 99 (quoting Varian-Eimac, 
Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
The Mission admits that it has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. 
(See, Opening Brief at 38-39 ("The Mission and Pastor Wilson have presented 
factual patterns that justify several exceptions to the normal claim that obtaining 
declaratory or injunctive relief pursuant to the Utah Constitution requires an 
exhaustion of administrative remedies.").) The Mission's claims relate to land use 
decisions by the City. (See Opening Brief at 25-38 (discussing the perceived 
failings of the City's planning and zoning department and the Board of 
Adjustment).) The City's Code of Ordinances sets forth a process to appeal 
1Q 
adverse land use decisions or conditional use applications. (See Salt Lake City, 
UT Code of Ordinances ("SLCCO") 21 A. 16. OlOetseq. at tab 8; 21A.54.160-.170 
at tab 6.) In all instances the Mission failed to use this process to appeal any 
decisions made with respect to relocation of the Mission. (R. 3984 j^ 12 at tab 2; 
R. 311 lU 34 at tab 3; R. 3212 ffi[ 34-35 at tab 1; See R. 3121-3122 at tab 3 (not 
suggesting any appeal was taken).) 
The only instance where any appeal was taken of an administrative decision 
involved the Zoning Administrator's determination that the proposed use at 
Rosewood Terrace constituted 1) a place of worship and church-related activities; 
2) a residential boarding house; and 3) training, counseling, and treatment facility 
for individuals and families not living at the Mission. (R. 2127 in Opening Brief 
Addendum.) In that instance, the head of the local community counsel appealed 
that determination to the Board of Adjustment. (R. 3209 1) 31 at tab 1.) Because 
the Mission believed it was adversely influenced by that determination it could 
have appealed it within 30 days. (See SLCCO § 21 A. 16.040.) The Mission did 
not do so and cannot now claim to have exhausted the administrative procedure. 
The passage of years coupled with the Mission's failure to follow administrative 
procedures in a timely fashion cannot excuse the running of the statute of 
limitations or the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Because the Mission 
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has never tried to use the administrative procedure available to it, it cannot prove 
that such appeals would be futile. 
a. No Likelihood of Oppression or Injustice or 
Irreparable Injury. 
The Mission argues that it need not exhaust administrative remedies before 
bringing its claims (both federal and state) because "there is a likelihood of some 
[unconscionable] oppression or injustice" and cites Nebeker v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, f 14, 34 P.3d 180, 184.11 (Opening Brief at 39-41.) The 
Mission goes on to reference issues that do not support its claim of oppression or 
injustice. (R. 3996 ^ 51 at tab 2 (Mission admits it lost lease at Gateway because 
of its landlord's actions not those of the City); R. 3105 ^ 16 at tab 3 (City 
dismissed the charges against Pastor Wilson); See R. 3121-3122 at tab 3 
(suggesting Mission failed to appeal City's decision in 2004); Opening Brief at 
22-23 (Mission refuses to conduct activities with the same restrictions that apply 
to Interfaith churches); R. 3208-3209 ^ 30 & 3212 ^ 34 at tab 1 (Mission applied 
11
 The Mission's subsequent discussion of "irreparable injury" is no different than 
what the Nebeker decision refers to as oppression or injustice. C.f. Nebeker j^ ^ 
14-15 with Maverik Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 860 P.2d 
944, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (both relying on discussion of exception to 
exhaustion doctrine in Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989)). 
The Mission also cites to Johnson v. Hermes Assocs,, 2005 UT 82, ^ 19-20 n. 8 
and its discussion of irreparable injury. The discussion in Johnson, however 
relates to irreparable injury in the analysis of the availability of injunctive relief 
for private individuals from zoning violations by other private individuals, not as a 
basis to avoid the necessity of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id ^ 14, 
17. 
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for only one conditional use permit and failed to appeal its denial); R. 3992 ^36 
at tab 2 (Mission did not attempt to file a new conditional use application). More 
importantly, however, Nebeker squarely addresses the current situation a couple of 
paragraphs later: 
Indeed, "4if. . . an administrative proceeding might leave no remnant 
of the constitutional question, the administrative remedy plainly 
should be pursued.' " Id. (quoting Pub. Utils. Comm'n of California 
v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40, 78 S.Ct. 446, 2 L.Ed.2d 470 
(1958)). The rationale for this rule is that if a case "involves issues 
other than the constitutional claim," icL, then "pursuit of . . 
administrative remedies might obviate the need of addressing [a 
constitutional] issue," id. 
Nebeker, ^[16. In this case, the Mission's failure to complete conditional use 
applications generally and refusal to appeal the one decision on the conditional use 
application it made left open the possibility that the conditional use application 
may have been granted in those cases, thus obviating the need of this Court to 
decide the constitutional issue. Therefore, the Mission not only fails to put forth 
evidence of an unconscionable injustice that will evade review absent the Court's 
decision in this matter, but it fails to recognize that its situation is exactly that 
shown to warrant dismissal in Nebeker. 
b. Neither the Zoning Administrators Nor the Board of 
Adjustment Acted Beyond the Scope of Their Authority, 
The Mission cites to Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 390 P.2d 592, 
595 (Utah 1964) for an additional ground on which it could avoid having to 
?? 
exhaust administrative remedies. The Walker case did not require the plaintiff to 
exhaust administrative remedies where the power the administrator attempted to 
use exceeded the scope of his statutory authority. Id In particular, the plaintiff in 
Walker sought declaratory judgment regarding the State Bank Commissioner's 
right to approve "Branch Banks." Id at 593. Whether this exception still exists is 
questionable in light of the more recent case law discussing the exhaustion of 
remedies standard and the exceptions to it which do not reference this exception. 
See Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, If 14, 34 P.3d 180; Maverik 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 860 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Assuming that this exception does exist, it does not apply to this case. No 
question can exist that the Zoning Administrator and the Board of Adjustment 
have the authority to make interpretations about categories of land use. The 
Mission argues that the Zoning Administrator and the Board of Adjustment made 
their decisions in such a way as to violate its religious freedom under the State and 
Federal Constitutions. The Mission does not suggest that the Zoning 
Administrator and the Board of Adjustment have no authority to interpret how 
categories of land use apply to given factual situations. Thus, even if acting 
beyond the scope of authority provides an exception to the exhaustion of remedies 
requirement, it does not encompass the actions of which the Mission complains. 
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c. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Serves a 
Useful Purpose in This Case. 
The Mission asserts, in essence, that exhausting administrative remedies 
will serve no useful purpose because certain of the issues on appeal present 
threshold legal questions. (Opening Brief at 42-43.) The issues the Mission 
claims present these questions include 1) alleged due process violations, 2) the 
Zoning Administrator's 2004 letter indicating the binding nature of the 1999 
Board of Adjustment determination, and 3) vagueness challenges. (Opening Brief 
at 43.) The Opening Brief, however, does not argue a due process violation or a 
vagueness claim. The Opening Brief argues only the alleged violation of the 
Mission's right to the free exercise of religion. (See Opening Brief at 43, 49, 50.) 
,2Thus, the Mission's argument fails as to both the alleged due process violation or 
vagueness claim. 
With respect to the binding nature of the 1999 Board of Adjustment 
determination, the exhaustion of administrative remedies could serve the critical 
purpose of avoiding a constitutional decision. TDM, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 2004 
UT App 433, ^  5 103 P.3d 190 states that u[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies 
is still required when the administrative proceeding may obviate the need to reach 
the constitutional question." In particular, had the Mission appealed the 1999 
12
 While the brief suggests it will argue a Due Process violation as part of Issue #3, 
it never makes such an argument. Nothing in either the Issues or the argument 
address vagueness. 
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Board of Adjustment determination or if the Mission would apply for a conditional 
use permit, the City could grant permission to do what the Mission wishes to do. 
In that case, the Mission would not have a constitutional claim. Because the 
administrative proceedings could eliminate the need for this Court to reach the 
constitutional question, the Mission must exhaust its administrative remedies. 
Land use decisions may not be challenged in district court "until that person 
has exhausted his administrative remedies." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9(a)-801(l). 
Without the Mission exhausting its administrative remedies, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear any of the state constitutional allegations raised. See Patterson, 
2003 UT at ^16-17 (interpreting predecessor statute). None of the exceptions 
asserted by the Mission apply to the instant case, thus requiring dismissal of the 
action. 
2LL The Mission's Federal Constitutional Claims Are Not Ripe 
for Decision Because the City Has Not Made a Final 
Determination on The Contested Matters. 
The Mission claims it has been unable to locate in Salt Lake City, alleging 
discrimination based on its religious beliefs. However, the Mission has failed to 
obtain a final, definitive decision by City authorities and has not exhausted the 
conditional use process; the Mission filed one conditional use application which it 
did not appeal when an initial negative decision was made. (R. 3984 ^ 12 at tab 2; 
R. 3111 U 34; R. 3212 UK 34-35 at tab 1.) On these facts, the district court had 
sufficient grounds to dismiss the Mission's constitutional claims due to a lack of 
ripeness. See Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Com'n, 402 F.3d 342, 347-353 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (violation of free exercise of religion claim not ripe for hearing until 
plaintiff obtains a final decision from a local land use authority and exhausts the 
variance process). 
While failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives the Court of 
jurisdiction over the state claims, such exhaustion is not required to bring the 42 
U.S.C. section 1983 claims. See Patterson, J^ 18. However, in this case the 
Mission's failure to exhaust administrative remedies rises to the level of a lack of 
ripeness, thus depriving the Court of jurisdiction over the federal claims as well. 
Although similar, ripeness applies even where exhaustion may not because 
ripeness is more of a prudential concern and is well recognized in land use cases. 
See Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Com'n. 402 F.3d 342, 347-353 (2nd Cir. 
2005). 
The ripeness issue is critical in this case because although the Mission 
complains that the City denied it permission to locate its place of worship in 
various places in Salt Lake City, the Mission ultimately succeeded in locating in 
the Central Christian Church in the middle of the City without objection from the 
City and operated out of that location for several years. (Opening Brief at 24; R. 
3115 *f 46.) The Court cannot possibly know at this time what would have 
26 
happened had the Mission filed any additional conditional use permits or appealed 
the denial of the one it did file. Because the Mission did successfully relocate, the 
evidence shows it could have been successful if it had pursued any application. 
The Mission should complete the administrative process before bringing its claims 
to court so that the record is complete, and there is a final decision whose 
constitutionality the Court can consider. 
The Mission has not offered any basis to suggest that its federal claims are 
ripe, arguing only that the facts in dispute excuse the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies requirement. Exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine do not apply to the 
ripeness doctrine. The City argued that the claims were not ripe because the 
Mission never obtained a final decision from the City so there is nothing yet to 
challenge: the City's final decision maker could grant the requests. Ripeness 
differs from exhaustion.13 Plaintiffs do not make any arguments that will excuse a 
lack of ripeness. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss all of the Mission's 
claims. These claims will not be ripe until the Mission picks a location, applies 
13
 Patterson stated "Indeed, Pattersons correctly point out that they need not 
exhaust their administrative remedies before pursuing their federal § 1983 claims". 
2003 UT 13 at TI 18. However, Patterson suggests that this exception was 
inapplicable to a ripeness challenge because it later stated "Because we uphold the 
trial court's dismissal of Pattersons' § 1983 claims on the ground that no 
deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest has occurred, we need not 
reach the question of whether or not those claims were ripe for decision," 2003 
UT 13 at^28n.3. 
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for a conditional use, and obtains a final determination on the permit. Only at that 
time will the Court and the parties know what would have happened and whether 
any constitutional violations have occurred. A claim is not ripe for adjudication if 
it rests upon '"contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or 
indeed may not occur at all.'" Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) 
(quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); see 
Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981) 
("Where there exists no more than a difference of opinion regarding the 
hypothetical application of [law] to a situation in which the parties might, at some 
future time, find themselves, the question is unripe for adjudication.") 
"[Standing and ripeness are components of subject matter jurisdiction." 
Waco Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Lester & Coque Gibson, 22 S.W. 3d 849, 850 (Tex. 2000); 
Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Leavitt 215 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1241 (D. 
Utah 2002) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 244 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 
2001) ("' Whether a claim is ripe for adjudication . . . bears diredly on . . . 
jurisdiction.'")) Courts must dismiss a complaint when they "lack jurisdiction 
over the subject matter." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Thus, under the facts alleged, 
this Court can only dismiss the action. 
B. The City's Actions Do Not Violate the State Constitution. 
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If the Court sees fit to reach the merits of the Mission's case, it should 
uphold the district court's holding that the City has not violated the State 
Constitution. While the Court has not interpreted the free exercise and related 
clauses of the State Constitution, the City should prevail under the State 
Constitution even if the Court applied the compelling state interest standard 
suggested by Justice Durrant in his concurrence in State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, % 
70 &n. l,99P.3d820.14 
Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 
1988) involves the intersection of zoning laws and religious conduct under the 
compelling state interest standard. The Tenth Circuit in that case held "A church 
Some question exists as to whether application of the compelling state interest 
test by a state in interpreting its constitutional protection of the free exercise of 
religion violates the Federal Establishment Clause. See City of Flores v. Bourne, 
521 U.S. 507 (1997) J. Stevens' Dissent at 537 (stating the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act which attempted to reinstate the compelling state interest test "has 
provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. 
This governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden 
by the First Amendment."). Specifically, the federal test for detemiining an 
Establishment Clause violation is set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971): to withstand an Establishment Clause challenge, (1) a law must have a 
secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit 
religion; and (3) it must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with 
religion. 403 U.S. at 612-13. A state constitution with a free exercise of religion 
clause or perfect tolerance clause, whose main purpose is to protect religion does 
not have a secular puipose and has the primary effect of advancing religion. To 
the degree the clause is coextensive with the Federal Constitution, the state 
constitution would be protected, but if the clause is interpreted to protect more 
than the Federal Constitution—and in particular that which the U.S. Supreme 
Court has specifically found is not protected—it may well run afoul of the Federal 
Establishment Clause. 
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has no constitutional right to be free from reasonable zoning regulations nor does a 
church have a constitutional right to build its house of worship where it pleases." 
IdL, 859 F.2d at 826 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). This 
statement and the accompanying analysis would suggest denial of the State 
Constitutional claims should the compelling state interest standard be employed. 
The first question that the Court must ask is do the zoning ordinances 
regulate religious beliefs. If so, the ordinances are invalid, if not the second step 
of the test is reached. The ordinances in this case do not regulate religious beliefs. 
Places of worship are not prohibited everywhere in the City; the Mission has an 
absolute right to locate its place of worship in certain areas of the City. (R. 3200 f^ 
19 at tab 1.) The Mission also has the right to locate its place of worship in 
almost any area of the City if the impact is not excessive. (R. 3200 ^ 20 at tab 1.) 
No regulation depends on belief; the regulations apply to all places of worship. 
Having passed the first question, the second question that the Court must 
ask is whether the regulation of religious conduct by the zoning ordinances is 
permissible. In general, regulation of conduct, as opposed to belief, is permissible. 
Messiah Baptist, 859 F.2d at 824. In particular, the regulation of where an entity 
can build or locate a place of worship does not impermissibly regulate religious 
conduct. See id. at 824-25. 
By contrast, the record in our case discloses no evidence that the 
construction of a house of worship on the property in the A-2 
30 
zoning district is integrally related to underlying religious beliefs of 
the Church. The Church argues that constructing its house of 
worship is intimately bound to its religious tenets. As an abstract 
argument, this proposition is true. The evidence in the record, 
however, fails to establish any basis for this contention. The 
Church makes only a vague reference to a preference for a pastoral 
setting, but such is of no consequence to this analysis. What is 
important is that the record contains no evidence that building a 
church or building a church on the particular site is intimately 
related to the religious tenets of the church. At most, the record 
discloses the Church's preference is to construct its house of 
worship upon its land. We agree with the observation of the Sixth 
Circuit in Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, 
Inc. v. City of Lakewood, Ohio, 699 F.2d 303, 307, cert, denied, 
464 U.S. 815, 104 S.Ct. 72, 78 L.Ed.2d 85 (1983), that "building 
and owning a church is a desirable accessory of worship, not a 
fundamental tenet of the Congregation's religious beliefs." In short, 
under the facts of this case, the A-2 zoning regulations do not 
regulate any religious conduct of the church or its members. 
Id. 
Similarly, in this case no evidence suggests that locating the Mission's 
place of worship in the Rosewood Terrace building, or any other particular place, 
is integrally related to its underlying religious beliefs. Although the Mission 
believes that it must serve the poor and downtrodden, and even if a component of 
this service is serving meals and providing services in its place of worship, nothing 
in its religious beliefs says the place of worship must be located in one place or 
another. In fact, the Mission's proposal for the Rosewood Terrace building 
involved busing in most of the users of the building. (R. 3214 1 39 at tab 1.) 
Thus, the Rosewood Terrace location for their place of worship is not critical to 
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the Mission's religious tenets nor is any other specific location. Thus, as long as 
the Mission has options to locate its place of worship somewhere in the City as a 
matter of right, the City is not impermissibly regulating conduct. 
Significantly, the Mission did successfully locate and operate its place of 
worship, and act on its religious beliefs, in the Central Christian Church located at 
370 East 300 South in Salt Lake City. (Opening Brief at 24, R. 3115 % 46.) The 
Mission's successful operation provides important support for the City's 
arguments because the Mission cannot argue that not being able to locate its place 
of worship at Rosewood Terrace coerced it to violate its beliefs. The Mission was 
fully able to act on its religious beliefs by locating its place of worship in a 
different area. Although the Central Christian Church location may have been 
somewhat more expensive, increased expense does not equate with impermissible 
regulation of conduct: "[W]e agree that the financial consequences to the church 
do not rise to infringement of religious freedom. As the court stated in 
Lakewood, id. at 307, 'the First Amendment does not require the City to make all 
land or even the cheapest or most beautiful land available to churches.' We 
agree." Messiah Baptist at 825. 
The Mission also raises the claim that the general nature of the zoning laws 
limiting the location of places of worship as a matter of right to certain areas of the 
City and requiring a conditional use permit to locate in other areas violates its 
32 
constitutional rights. In the abstract, Messiah Baptist precludes this argument, 
there is no general "constitutional right to be free from reasonable zoning 
regulations nor does a church have a constitutional right to build its house of 
worship where it pleases." Messiah Baptist, 859 F.2d at 826. In the particular, 
there are no specific factors to analyze and apply the law to because the Mission 
has not applied for any other conditional use permits or sought a final 
determination on the one that was denied. (R. 3212-3 ^ 34-36 at tabl.) Until the 
Mission files a specific application for a conditional use permit, goes through the 
process, and then has the use denied, there is no violation. See Murphy v. New 
Milford Zoning Com'n. 402 F.3d 342 (2nd Cir. 2005) (violation of free exercise of 
religion claim not ripe for hearing until plaintiff obtained a final decision from a 
local land use authority and exhausted the variance process). 
C. The City's Actions Do Not Violate the Federal Constitution. 
Even if this Court overturns the lower court's holding of a lack of ripeness 
and a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it should nonetheless uphold the 
district court's holding that the City has not violated the Federal Constitution. The 
Mission alleges that the City's "previous, definite completed actions" violate the 
Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Mission does not challenge 
the district court's dismissal of its Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA") claims. Therefore, the law governing the Free 
Exercise claim at issue is Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The 
test to determine constitutionality in the face of a free exercise claim is set forth in 
Smith as follows: if the challenged law is 1) generally applicable and 2) religion-
neutral, then it is constitutional. See Smith, at 877-882 (explaining the rational 
behind the test). The City's zoning ordinances apply to all City residents without 
distinction as to religious affiliation. Therefore, the zoning ordinances are 
generally applicable. As set forth above, the limitations on homeless shelters 
apply to all homeless shelters, not merely the Mission. (R. 3987 - 3988 f^f 21-25 
at tab 2.) Likewise, the zoning laws with respect to places of worship are the same 
regardless of religious affiliation. (R. 3200 fflf 19-20 at tab 1; R. 3989 f 28 at tab 
2.) Thus, the zoning laws are religion-neutral. Moreover, the City has a rational 
basis in establishing zoning laws to promote the health and safety of its citizens. 
See Messiah Baptist, 859 F.2d at 823-24 ('The power of local governments to 
zone and control land use is undoubtedly broad and its proper exercise is an 
essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory quality of life in both urban and rural 
communities."). 
First Assembly Of God Of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, Florida, 
20 F.3d 419 (11th Cir. 1994) is virtually identical to the instant case. There, 
plaintiff First Assembly was a Christian church that believed that sheltering the 
homeless was an essential aspect of its Christian religion. Id. at 422. First 
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Assembly was located in a zoning district that allowed places of worship and their 
customary "accessory uses." Id. at 420. First Assembly converted a building on 
its property into a homeless shelter. Collier County found that First Assembly was 
operating its homeless shelter in violation of several zoning ordinances. Collier 
County determined that the shelter was not a "customary accessory use" of the 
church and that the applicable housing and zoning codes did not permit the shelter 
space to be used as a residence for such a large number of people. Id 
First Assembly contended that the enforcement of zoning ordinances 
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because it prevented the 
church from practicing its religion. First Assembly claimed that sheltering the 
homeless was an essential aspect of the Christian religion; thus, the forced closing 
of the homeless shelter interfered with First Assembly's free exercise of religion. 
Id. at 422-23. Summary judgment was granted to Collier County. IcL at 420-21. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and held that the zoning 
ordinances did not violate First Assembly's rights. The First zoning ordinance 
challenged—that zoned an entire residential area with a special exception for 
churches—was neutral on its face and was of general applicability, thus it did not 
implicate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. 
The second zoning ordinance challenged—identifying a homeless shelter as 
a group home and providing regulations for its operation—was also facially 
neutral and constitutional. Id. at 423. The court found that the ordinance applied 
to any homeless shelter, regardless of who operated it. The court found that the 
ordinance defined areas in which the shelters may operate and provided 
regulations for such. 
These regulations apply to all group homes, once again regardless of 
their ownership or affiliation, and were motivated by wholly secular 
concerns. The intent of the ordinance was not to inhibit or oppress 
any religion; rather, the Commission was motivated to address a 
general problem of health and safety concerns. The fact that First 
Assembly was affected was incidental. Thus, this ordinance is of 
general applicability. 
Id 
First Assembly is persuasive and the same result should occur in the instant 
case. Salt Lake City's ordinances are neutral on their face and are generally 
applicable. As set forth above, the City has regulated all homeless shelters, 
regardless of their ownership or affiliation, and these regulations are motivated by 
wholly secular concerns, not religious concerns. (R. 3200 [^f 19-20 at tab 1; R. 
3989 TJ 28 at tab 2.) That the Mission is affected is incidental and not a 
constitutional violation. While religious belief may not be regulated, conduct 
may, and operating a homeless shelter is specifically conduct that may be 
regulated by zoning ordinances. 
First Assembly did note that Collier County had not prohibited the 
operation of homeless shelters altogether. Salt Lake City has not prohibited the 
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operation of homeless shelters altogether, they are a conditional use in several 
zones, and Salt Lake City has several operating homeless shelters. (R. 3987-3988 
ffif 22, 23!5 at tab 2.) 
Under the Smith analysis, no violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the 
Federal Constitution has occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
The City respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
summary judgment in its favor. The Court can affimi the summary judgment on 
one of two grounds. In the first instance, the Court held and the City agrees that 
the Mission's claims are not ripe and the Mission failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies. As a result, the Court lacks jurisdiction to do anything other than 
dismiss the case. Were the Court to disagree and find that it did have jurisdiction, 
the Court can still affirm the district court's determination that the City's actions at 
issue comport with the requirements of both the State and Federal Constitutions. 
Under either theory, the Court should affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment on behalf of the City. 
While Plaintiffs refer to an Affidavit of Matthew Hilton in their brief, they do 
not cite to a paragraph and no part of the Affidavit appears to relate to the City's 
homeless shelters. (See R. 3809-3820 at tab 4.) 
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